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built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.” 
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Under Article 126 TFEU “Member States shall avoid excessive government 
deficits”. Member States are still in charge of their own budgetary policies, but they are 
still under the scope of the Treaties. Paragraph 7 of Article 126  states that “Where the 
Council decides, in accordance with paragraph 6, that an excessive deficit exists, it 
shall adopt, without undue delay, on a recommendation from the Commission, 
recommendations addressed to the Member State concerned with a view to bringing 
that situation to an end within a given period. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 8, 
these recommendations shall not be made public.” The changes brought by recent 
pieces of legislation reinforced the enforceability given to Recommendations on the 
matter of Economic and Monetary Integration.  
The Nature of Recommendations was addressed by the ECJ in Grimaldi and in 
Altair Chimica. It was there stated that Recommendations might carry legal 
enforceability, and that their content should be interpreted regarding its execution. 
It is my understanding that the current legal framework regarding 
Recommendations, more specifically Recommendations made under an Excessive 
Deficit Procedure, should be revisited in order to answer the questions of their 
enforceability. The answers to these questions are crucial pieces of the puzzle in which 
the Economic and Monetary Governance of the European Union entrenched in. As the 
time passes and more procedures of this kind come to their final stages, the more likely 
it is to a Member State or its Courts to challenge such Recommendations enforceability. 
This is why I believe it is relevant to revisit the question regarding Recommendations in 
order to make some sense of what really is the corrective arm of the Stability and 
Growth Pact. 
 
Keywords: European Union, Economic and Monetary Union, Stability and Growth 
Pact, Excessive Deficit Procedure, Recommendations, Altair Chimica, Grimaldi. 
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CHAPTER I  
 “Life in the Valley” 
 
“Once upon a time, not too long ago”1, in the greenest of the valleys there were a 
few small villages, made entirely of white stone and maple wood, settled alongside a 
river so clear that, from shore to shore, you could see all kinds of fish swimming 
upstream. Among those villages three special clans lived their lives in peace and 
harmony: the clan of the Good people, the Bad people and the Ugly ones.  
The valley was prosperous, trade was blooming, primarily due to an old 
agreement between its villages to facilitate trade; they even shared a common currency, 
which made their merchants’ life a lot easier by granting price stability and lower 
transaction costs. 
But one day the level of the river started to decrease severely, making it more 
difficult for villagers to make their living.  To add to that crisis, fishermen from the 
Ugly people’s villages bought a great deal of “toxic” fish, putting them in danger and 
likely to default with their own obligations regarding the common market. Rather than 
facing a meltdown of its economy, the leaders of the Ugly decided to bail out their 
fishermen. As a result, these villages have now a large volume of public debt and face 
liquidity problems. 
Bad people’s villages also faces their own liquidity problems. They already had a 
problem of public debt, but now are finding out that, because of the lowering of the 
river’s level, it has become more and more difficult to borrow money in the markets, 
either by borrowing directly from banks or by selling bonds to private merchants. When 
their struggles became public, private merchants panicked and refused to buy their 
bonds. To make up for the risk levels, the Bad have to offer an ever-increasing interest 
rate, which very soon will make it so expensive for it to borrow money through the 
issuing of bonds, they will be shut down from the market, and therefore be unable to 
borrow the necessary money to refinance their debt. The risk of default is now at its 
highest. 
                                                          
1 Jay-Z “99 Problems” (The Black Album, Def Jam, 2004) 
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As everyone in the valley shares a common currency, they all decide to bail-out 
both the Ugly and the Bad in risk of default. Investors are already worried about the 
creditworthiness of other members of the valley, which makes it more likely that these 
other villages, will also face escalating costs when borrowing money from the markets. 
The economies of every village in the valley are also intertwined in other ways as, for 
example, the Good people’s villages’ banks own a great portion of the Ugly people’s 
debt; so much that the Good people’s economy would suffer a severe blow if the Ugly 
were unable to pay their debt. 
Adding to the unsettling mood that spread across the valley, villagers from 
different parts of the valley are worried about the fate of the bail-out money. Residents 
of the Good people villages are not happy about sending their tax money to the Bad or 
the Ugly. They think that they should not be paying for other village’s mistakes. 
Villages which, on their minds, were not as responsible as they were. They also think 
that the moment the Ugly receive their bail-out, they will just go back to spending too 
much, believing that they shall be saved again if necessary. 
On the other hand, Bad and Ugly villagers hope for some solidarity from the rest 
of the valley, and they argue that the richer villages, like the Good people villages, have 
benefited from the common market of the valley and from the common currency for 
many years. In fact, they argue that they benefited more than anyone else. 
  In order to receive the bail-out, the Bad and the Ugly have to comply with a strict 
set of conditions, they have to make dramatic economic reforms. Some villagers from 
the Bad and the Ugly find these conditions unfair. Villagers from across the valley feel 
let down and tensions grow; there is a whispering against the Good; the Good, on the 
other hand, do not understand the backlash and feel that the entire valley is taking 
advantage of them. 
To make sure this sort of things do not happen again, there is a consensus that the 
common market and comment currency framework needs to change. 
Firstly, Ugly’s problems could have been avoided if their fishermen behaviour 
had been better regulated. Secondly, the leaders of the valley agreed that no village 
should be allowed to get in a situation as that of the Bad people before the bail-out. A 
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stricter set of rules, put in place at the time of the beginning of the common market and 
currency, created in order to enhance control over public spending, would in principle 
have stopped the villages from accumulating such a volume of debt. But such rules were 
never properly enforced. Accordingly, the leaders want to give teeth to this 
mechanisms, by adopting new measures to make sure that sanctions are applied 
whenever a village goes above the level of debt or deficit set out in those rules. 
In order to improve surveillance over the budgets, every year members of the 
common currency have to send reports on the state of their economy, as well as draft 
budgets for the next year, to a commission responsible for overseeing them. The 
commission produces a report for each village with specific recommendations. For 
instance, recommendations regarding a village’s pension system, or the need to cut 
salaries in the public sector. If a village is perceived to be in trouble, either because of 
its excessive deficit or because of imbalances in its economy, it will be placed under a 
special monitoring and, if it fails to address the situation, sanctions may be imposed 
under certain criteria. 
Some villages, together with the commission, reason that this sort of control has 
been proven necessary by the crisis and that the mechanisms put in place and the 
common currency have no future without it. Other leaders of the valley start 
demonstrating their discontent with what they perceive as undemocratic interference 
from the commission, and villagers grumble. As villages tend to consider that these 
recommendations undermine their authority, independence and democratic legitimacy, 
questions regarding their enforceability start to arise. 
This little tail comprises what the European Union (EU) and the Eurozone are 
facing at the moment. The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) and the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) have evolved over the 
years, but they are now at a time where everything might be put in question if no light is 
shed over their strength.2 It is our understanding that the current legal framework 
regarding Recommendations, more specifically Recommendations made under an EDP, 
should be revisited in order to answer the questions of their enforceability. As the time 
                                                          
2 CHAMPEAU, Serge; CLOSA, Carlos; INNERARITY, Daniel; POIARES PESSOA MADURO, Luis 
Miguel, “The future of Europe : democracy, legitimacy and justice after the Euro crisis”(Rowman & 
Littlefield International, 2014) 
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passes and more procedures of this kind are initiated, the more likely it is for a Member 
State to challenge such Recommendations. Also, as a last resort a Member State might 
simply not comply with any recommendations and questions regarding the primacy of 
EU law will arise, namely on a constitutional level and its increased tensions.3 This is 
why we believe it is relevant to revisit the question regarding Recommendations 
enforceability, the missing link of the EDP. 
To do so we shall take a comprehensive approach to the EMU, focused on its 
recent changes driven by the financial crisis, then we shall analyse in more detail the 
preventive and the corrective arms of the SGP. This shall be followed by an 
examination of the general framework of Recommendations under EU Law and 
compare them under the architecture of the EDP. With this approach we hope to obtain 











                                                          
3 MADURO,  Miguel Poiares; FRADA, António; PIERDOMINICI, Leonardo, “A Crisis Between Crisis; 
Placing the Portuguese Constitutional Jurisprudence of Crisis in Context” (E-Pública Revista Eletrónica 
de Direito Público, Vol. 4, nº 1, May, 2017) pp. 10 




“The Economic and Monetary Union” 
 
The case for EMU is based on the argument that it would foster economic growth 
and provide greater price stability through low inflation. This argument is based on 
several factors, being one that EMU would save transaction costs, as a single currency 
removes the cost of exchange-rate conversions when money moves within the EU.4 The 
Commission estimated that the total savings would be approximately €25 billion.5 
The case against EMU focus on the argument that the Member States were not 
ready for it and that such a commitment to further integration lacked common political 
will. But the fact is that EMU was put into action and it is now one of the most relevant 
aspects of EU integration, but of course it is also one of the most controversial.6 
Nonetheless, the EMU represents a major step in European Integration, one that 
has deepen the ties between EU economies. The EMU was a recurring ambition for the 
European Union as it promised stability and an environment for higher growth and 
employment. However, a variety of political and economic obstacles barred the way. 
Weak political commitment, divisions over economic priorities and turbulence in 
international markets, all played their role in frustrating progress towards EMU.7 
Despite those obstacles, a growing number of EU Member States sought for 
deeper economic integration as a means of strengthening the political bonds between 
them and protecting the market. 
The international currency stability that reigned in the immediate post-war period 
did not last.8 In the late 1960’s turmoil on international currency markets threatened the 
common price system of the common agricultural policy, a main pillar of what was then 
                                                          
4 CRAIG, Paul, DE BÚRCA, Gráinne, “EU LAW, Text, Cases and Materials” (Oxford University Press 
6th edn, 2015) pp. 701 
5 GRAUWE, Paul de, “Economics of Monetary Union” Oxford University Press, 6th edn, 2005. 
6 HINAREJOS, Alicia “Economic and Monetary Union” (in “European Union Law” Oxford Univeristy 
Press, 2014) pp.567 
7 European Commission Report “One Currency for One Europe, The Road to the Euro” Belgium, 2007 
8 SHEVCHENKO, Taras “European Monetary Union: Theory, History and Consequences” Kyiv National 
University, 2009 
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the European Economic Community. In response to this troubling background, the 
EMU was put on the European agenda, when the Heads of Government agreed that a 
plan should be drawn up to create an economic and monetary union within the 
Community, this led to the Werner Report in 1970.9 
The Werner group set out a three-stage process to achieve EMU within ten years, 
including the possibility of a single currency. The Member States agreed in principle in 
1971 and began the first stage: narrowing currency fluctuations. However, a fresh wave 
of currency instability on international markets squashed any hopes of tying the 
Community's currencies closer together. Subsequent attempts at achieving stable 
exchange rates were hit by oil crises and other shocks until, in 1979, the European 
Monetary System (EMS) was launched.10 
The EMS determined that the reference for exchange rates would be a newly 
created European Currency Unit (ECU), a weighted average of EMS currencies. The 
EMS represented a new and unprecedented coordination of monetary policies between 
the Member States, and operated successfully for over a decade.11 
This success provided the impetus for further discussions between the Member 
States on achieving economic and monetary union. At the request of the European 
leaders, the European Commission President, Jacques Delors, and the central bank’s 
governors of the EU Member States produced the 'Delors Report' on how EMU could 
be achieved. 
The Delors Report proposed a three-stage plan for economic and monetary union 
and the euro area, to be achieved between 1990 and 1999. Preparations involved: Stage 
1: completing the internal market (1990-1994), namely through the introduction of the 
free movement of capital; Stage 2: preparing for the European Central Bank (ECB) and 
the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), and achieving economic convergence 
                                                          
9 “Report to the Council and the commission on the realization by stages of the Economic and Monetary 
Union in the Community” Luxemburg, 1970 
10 European Commission “One currency for one Europe, The road to the euro”, European Communities, 
2007 
11 Summaries of EU legislation “Towards a single currency: a brief history of EMU” 2011 
  ‘Til Debt Do Us Part 
11 
 
(1994-1999); and Stage 3: fixing exchange rates and launching the euro (1999 
onwards).12 
The European leaders accepted the recommendations in the Delors Report and the 
decision to form an economic and monetary union was finally adopted by the European 
Council, the new Treaty on European Union, which contained the provisions needed to 
implement EMU, was agreed at the European Council held at Maastricht, the 
Netherlands, in December 1991.  
EMU involves coordination of economic and fiscal policies, a common monetary 
policy and a common currency, conducted by a single monetary authority. It delivers 
coordination of economic policy-making between Member States, coordination of fiscal 
policies, notably through the SGP, (which imposes limits on government debt and 
deficit, an independent monetary policy run by the European Central Bank), the single 
currency and the euro area. 
Not all Member States of the EU participate in all phases of EMU: as of 2016, 19 
Member States have entered the last stage of the EMU and adopted the euro as their 
currency, these countries constitute the Eurozone or “euro area”. 
A vast net of bodies is responsible for the economic policy, which includes 
Member States and EU institutions. The European Council sets the main policy 
orientations; the Council of the EU coordinates EU economic policy-making13 and 
decides whether a Member State may adopt the euro; the “Eurogroup”, a meeting of the 
finance ministers of the Eurozone, coordinates policies of common interest for the euro 
area Member States; Member States set their national budgets within agreed limits for 
deficit and debt, and determine their own structural policies involving labour, pensions 
and capital markets; the European Central Bank sets monetary policy, with price 
stability as the primary objective; finally the European Commission monitors 
performance and compliance; the European Parliament shares the job of formulating 
legislation with the Council, and subjects economic governance to democratic scrutiny. 
                                                          
12 Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union, “Report on economic and monetary union 
in the European community” 1989 
13 Article 2(3) TFEU 
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The current framework was the result of the 1960’s debate between “monetarists” 
and “economists”. The “monetarists” believed that the starting point of the EMU should 
be fixing exchange rates or the introduction of a common currency, and coordination 
should then follow. The “economists” believed that coordination policies should happen 
prior to the introduction of a common currency. In this context, it is important to note 
the theory of the Endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area, from which, its members 
can build an optimum currency area ex post even if they do not do ex ante.14 This 
position is underpinned by the idea that a monetary union will progressively lead to a 
decrease of asymmetric shocks and greater association between the economic 
fluctuations of the Member States.15 The “monetarists” view prevailed and the design of 
EMU gives great emphasis to the monetary component, while integration of economic 
policies lags behind. The result was a centralized monetary policy for the euro area 
conducted by the ECB, assisted by the national central banks; all together they form the 
European System of Central banks. But at the same time, economic policy remains in 
the hands of Member States, there is, therefore, an underlying tension within EMU 
between a centralized monetary policy and an essentially decentralized economic and 
fiscal policy, i.e. the EMU includes a full monetary union conducted at EU level, while 
economic/fiscal policies are still conducted at the national level.16 
The asymmetric design of the EMU proved to have certain flaws and was 
redesigned in order to enhance coordination of economic policy. The multilateral 
surveillance mechanism was enhanced as the economic health of individual Member 
Stares’ economies can have a marked impact on the evaluation of the Euro. 
Articles 121 and 126 of the TFEU, which provide the legal basis of the SGP, were 
reformed by Regulation (EU) 1466/97, of July 7th on the strengthening of the 
surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic 
policies and Regulation 1467/97 of July 7th on speeding up and clarifying the 
implementation of the excessive deficit procedure. The purpose of the SGP was to 
ensure fiscal discipline in the EU by setting reference values for annual national budget 
                                                          
14 PRAUSELLO, Franco, “The Theory of Endogenous Optimum Currency Areas: A Critical Note” in 
“Economica Internazionale”, vol. 65, n.º 1, 2012, p 84. 
15 TORRES, Francisco, “The Economic and Political Debate on EMU: Europe and Portugal” in “Temas 
de Integração”, n.º 4, 1997, p.73. 
16 GOUCHA SOARES, António, “O que nasce torto…”, p. 54. 
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deficits at 3% of GDP and public debt at 60% of the GDP, these values are defined in 
Protocol 1217. This pact applies to all EU members, but it has stricter enforcement 
mechanisms for the Eurozone Member States. 18 
These mechanisms consist of two parts: Art. 121 outlines the preventive arm of the 
SGP, Art. 126 of the Treaty forms the basis for the corrective arm, and the Excessive 
Deficit Procedure (EDP). Thus, it was created two set of legal instruments: a "soft" 
instrument for economic stabilization policy, which requires coordination, and a "hard" 
instrument on fiscal discipline and monetary policy.19 
The preventive arm of the SGP foresees the European Semester. The European 
Semester aims to coordinate at European level the main economic and budgetary 
planning exercises of Member States.20 Every year in April, euro area member states 
submit stability programmes, while Member States outside the euro area submit 
convergence programmes, which outline the main elements of the Member States’ 
budgetary plans and are assessed by the Commission. Based on its assessment on the 
stability and convergence programmes, the Commission draws up country-specific 
recommendations on which the Council adopts opinions. These include 
recommendations for appropriate policy actions. 
The corrective arm of the SGP is the EDP. This procedure is triggered if a member 
state's budget deficit exceeds 3% of GDP. When the Council decides that the deficit is 
excessive, it makes recommendations to the Member State concerned and sets a 
deadline for bringing the deficit back below the reference value. At this point, if the 
Member State fails to comply, the Council can impose sanctions. The SGP applies to all 
EU countries, but the sanctions can be imposed only on euro area member states.  
In practice, however, the need for political agreement within the Council in order to 
impose sanctions meant that the corrective arm of the Pact lacked effectiveness, as 
                                                          
17 Protocol (No 12) on the excessive deficit procedure , Official Journal 115 , 09/05/2008 P. 0279 - 0280 
18 European Commission Communication, “Economic governance review Report on the application of 
Regulations (EU) n° 1173/2011, 1174/2011, 1175/2011, 1176/2011, 1177/2011, 472/2013 and 473/2013” 
(COM(2014) 905) Brussels, 2014 
19 CRAIG, Paul, DE BÚRCA, Gráinne, “EU LAW, Text, Cases and Materials” (Oxford University 
Press6th edn, 2015) pp. 734-735 
20 MADURO,  Miguel Poiares; FRADA, António; PIERDOMINICI, Leonardo, “A Crisis Between Crisis; 
Placing the Portuguese Constitutional Jurisprudence of Crisis in Context” (E-Pública Revista Eletrónica 
de Direito Público, Vol. 4, nº 1, May, 2017) pp. 15 
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revealed in 2002 and 2003, when the Commission initiated excessive deficit procedures 
against Germany and France.21 At the time, these countries adopted measures not 
considered effective enough by the Commission, therefore the Commission urged the 
Council to pursue more forceful action, but the Council decided not to follow the 
Commission’s recommendations.  
The Commission then challenged before the European Court of Justice22 (ECJ) the 
legality of the Council’s measures in abeyance for France and Germany.23 The Court 
found that the Council’s decision to place the EDP in abeyance was unlawful, however 
it rejected the Commission’s claim that the Council’s failure to adopt the Commission’s 
recommendation was itself a decision, and that it should be annulled under Article 230 
EC. It was settled that the Commission could not require the Council to pursue further 
action against France, Germany or any other country that breached the Pact. Recurring 
breaches without significant consequences were likely to diminish the credibility of the 
Pact further. It was then considered preferable to reform the Pact, and in 2005 its rules 
were made more flexible, allowing for broader discretion,24 25 the final result of which 
was the Pact losing its teeth, making it clear that there was no credible sanctioning 
mechanisms put in place to enforce the Pact. 
The EMU needed a central monetary policy and effective coordination of economic 
and fiscal policies, yet this coordination was shown to be more difficult than what was 
anticipated.26 This imbalance triggered many of the current problems we are facing, 
which were severely amplified by the euro area crisis. 
 
 
                                                          
21 AZEVEDO, Maria Eduarda, “O Duplo Impulso para a Refundação da Europa – da Convenção 
Europeia ao Novo Modelo de Governação Económica”, in Estudos Jurídicos e Económicos em 
Homenagem ao Prof. Doutor António de Sousa Franco, vol III, Coimbra Editora, 2006, p. 53. 
22 Case C-27/04 Commission v Council [2004] ECR I-6649 
23 2546yh Meeting of the Council of the European Union (Economic and Financial Affairs), Brussels 25 
Nov. 2003. 
24 Council Regulation (EC) No 1055/2005 amending Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 (OJ [2005] L174/1); 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1056/2005 amending Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 (OJ [2005] L174/5). 
25 MADURO,  Miguel Poiares; FRADA, António; PIERDOMINICI, Leonardo, “A Crisis Between Crisis; 
Placing the Portuguese Constitutional Jurisprudence of Crisis in Context” (E-Pública Revista Eletrónica 
de Direito Público, Vol. 4, nº 1, May, 2017) pp. 16 
26 HINAREJOS, Alicia “Economic and Monetary Union” (in “European Union Law” Oxford Univeristy 
Press, 2014) pp.571. 




“Economic Governance and the Euro Crisis” 
 
The recent financial and sovereign debt crisis subjected the EU’s regime for 
coordination of economic policy to a more general strain and to deep reforms in the 
Economic and Monetary Governance in the EU, particularly in the Euro area, leading 
the EU institutions into a process of co-government of debt and deficits.27 Those 
reforms operated a structural change in the architecture of the EMU: surveillance 
systems have been strengthened for budgetary and economic policies and a new 
budgetary timeline for the euro area has been introduced. 
The European Council and Commission were the main players devising the 
strategy and to this end they put forward several legislative proposals through time. 
Firstly, in 2011, they introduced the six legislative proposals in order to monitor both 
budgetary and economic policies under the European Semester. In 2013 through the 
“Two-Pack” adherence to the SGP is further strengthened by new laws, as the “Two 
Pack” reinforces economic coordination between Member States and introduces new 
monitoring tools.28 On the same year the importance of the budgetary targets set by the 
SGP’s preventive arm (the Medium-Term Objectives or “MTO”), are strengthened by 
the “Fiscal Compact”, which is part of an inter-governmental treaty known as the Treaty 
on Stability, Coordination and Governance (TSCG). In 2014 there was a review of the 
“Six Pack” and “Two Pack” rules which was called for in the legislation, determined 
that the legislation had contributed to the progress of fiscal consolidation in the EU. The 
review highlighted some strengths as well as possible areas for improvement. Finally, in 
2015 the Commission issues guidance on how it will apply the SGP rules to strengthen 
the link between structural reforms, investment and fiscal responsibility in support of 
jobs and growth. 
We now must look in more detail at each of this “pack of rules” in order to 
understand the role they had on the current strength of the SGP. 
                                                          
27 CHALMERS, Damian, “The European Redistributive State and a European Law of Struggle” 
(European Law Journal, Vol. 18, Issue 5, September, 2012) pp. 680 
28 SADELEER, Nicolas de, “The New Architecture of the European Economic governance: A Leviathan 
or a flat-footed Colossus?” in Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, Vol. 19, n.º3, 2012 
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a) The “Six-Pack”  
In 13th December 2011 the legislative package on economic governance, “Six-
Pack”, entered into force. The first major response to what was the banking and 
financial crisis that began in 2008 and also the most comprehensive reinforcement of 
economic governance in the EU, since the launch of the EMU.29 Secondary legislation 
governing the SGP was initially introduced in 1997, with significant reforms in 2005 
and now 201130. The 2011 reforms which are referred as the “Six-Pack”, significantly 
strengthened both the fiscal surveillance and enforcement provisions of the SGP by 
adding an expenditure benchmark to review countries' fiscal positions, operationalising 
the Treaty's debt criterion, introducing an early and gradual system of financial 
sanctions for euro area Member States, and requiring new minimum standards for 
national budgetary frameworks. 
The 2011 reforms also brought the surveillance of both budgetary and economic 
policies together under the European Semester, to ensure the consistency of the policy 
advice given. 31 
The Six-Pack is composed by 6 sets of rules: Regulation (EU) No 1173/2011 on 
the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area; Regulation (EU) 
No 1174/2011 on enforcement measures to correct excessive macroeconomic 
imbalances in the euro area; Regulation (EU) No 1175/2011 amending this Regulation 
on surveillance procedures for budgetary positions; Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 on 
the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances; Regulation (EU) No 
1177/2011 amending the procedure on excessive deficits; Directive No 2011/85/EU on 
requirements for budgetary frameworks of the Member States. 
This set of rules applies to the 27 Member States but it has special rules for euro 
area Member States, especially regarding sanctions. In the fiscal field, the six-pack 
strengthens the SGP by reinforcing both the preventive and the corrective arm of the 
Pact, i.e. the EDP. 
                                                          
29 “EU Economic governance: The Commission delivers a comprehensive package of legislative 
measures”, (IP/10/1199, 29 September 2010) 
30 European Commission MEMO/13/318 
31 European Commission MEMO/11/14 “European semester: a new architecture for the new EU 
Economic governance – Q&A”  
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The six-pack ensures stricter application of the fiscal rules by defining 
quantitatively what a "significant deviation" from the Midterm Objective (MTO) or the 
adjustment path towards it means in the context of the preventive arm. Moreover, the 
six-pack operationalizes the debt criterion, so that an EDP may also be launched on the 
basis of a debt ratio above 60% of GDP which would not diminish towards the Treaty 
reference value at a satisfactory pace (and not only on the basis of a deficit above 3% of 
GDP, which had been the case so far). 
Financial sanctions for euro area Member States are imposed in a gradual way, 
from the preventive arm to the latest stages of the EDP, and may eventually reach 0.5% 
of GDP. The six-pack introduces inverse qualified majority voting (RQMV) for most 
sanctions, therefore increasing their likelihood for euro area Member States. RQMV 
implies that a recommendation or a proposal of the Commission is considered adopted 
in the Council unless a qualified majority of Member States votes against it.32 
 
b) Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance: “The Fiscal 
Compact” 
In a later moment, in response to the crisis, an inter-governmental treaty was 
agreed upon. This was particularly interesting in regards of the institutional balance of 
the EU as this response came not within the Union per se, (by its institutions) but 
through state-level negotiations. This treaty, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance (TSCG), contained the “Fiscal Compact”. The Fiscal Compact requires 
Member States to enshrine in national law a balanced budget rule with an annual lower 
limit of a structural deficit of 0.5% GDP, centred on the concept of the country-specific 
MTO as defined in the SGP. The Fiscal Compact’s provisions also increase the role of 
independent bodies, which are given the task of monitoring compliance with the 
national fiscal rules, including the operation of the national correction mechanism in 
case of deviation from the MTO or the adjustment path towards it. The TSCG, signed 
by 25 EU Member States (all but UK and Czech Republic), entered into force on 
January 1, 2013 and is binding for all euro area Member States that have ratified it, 
                                                          
32 “Six-pack? Two-pack? Fiscal compact? A short guide to the new EU fiscal governance” available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/articles/governance/2012-03-14_six_pack_en.htm  
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while other contracting parties will be bound only once they adopt the euro or earlier if 
they signal it. 
These budget rules shall be implemented in national law through provisions of 
"binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional" as stated in Article 3 
of the TSCG. 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) may impose financial sanction (0.1% of 
GDP) if a country does not properly implement the new budget rules in national law and 
fails to comply with a ECJ ruling that requires it to do so. In the case of euro area 
Member States, sanctions would be channelled to the European Stability Mechanism 
(ESM), in the case of "non-euro area Member States", the money would be attributed to 
the EU budget. 
Compliance with the rule implementing the MTO in national law will also be 
monitored at the national level by independent institutions. 
Other provisions aim at reinforcing the implementation of the Stability and 
Growth Pact: re-statement of the debt rule set up by the six-pack, behavioural 
commitment reproducing RQMV among euro area Member States when the 
Commission considers that an excessive deficit exists (formal modification of the voting 
rules would require a Treaty change). 
Finally, the TSCG set the stones for a reinforced surveillance and coordination 
of economic policies, with ex ante coordination of debt issuance plans among 
Contracting Parties and economic partnership programmes for Member States in EDP, 
which detail the structural reforms needed for an effective and durable correction of 
their excessive deficit.33 
c) The “Two-Pack” 
Fearing the potential consequences of “spillovers” among euro area Member 
States' economic and budgetary situations, the “Two-Pack” was adopted in May 2013, 
these new procedures are based on Article 136 of the EU Treaty. This Article enables 
euro area Member States to strengthen the coordination and surveillance of budgetary 
                                                          
33 Idem. 
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policies in order to ensure the necessary budgetary discipline in the Economic and 
Monetary Union. The new legislation therefore only applies to the euro area.34 
The Two-Pack Regulations entails Regulation No 472/2013 on the strengthening 
of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing 
or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability and 
Regulation No 473/2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft 
budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in 
the euro area. In abstract, these rules support adherence to the SGP's existing fiscal 
surveillance framework, while at the same time establish a comprehensive surveillance 
regime for those Member States in the euro area threatened with or experiencing serious 
difficulties with respect to their financial stability.  
This legislation introduces a European assessment of draft budgetary plans on a 
coordinated timeframe in autumn for euro area Member States and improves national 
budgetary frameworks by requiring them to set up independent bodies in charge of 
monitoring national fiscal rules and to base budgetary forecasts on independent 
macroeconomic forecasts. For euro area Member States in EDP, a system of graduated 
monitoring is established in order to secure a timely and durable correction of excessive 
deficits and to allow an early detection of risks that a Member State does not correct its 
excessive deficit by the deadline set by the Council. Requirements placed on financially 
fragile countries are streamlined for countries currently receiving financial assistance 
while enhancing monitoring that will also enable the Commission to better assess the 
risks threatening or faced by the Member State in question and thus, in some cases, 
address vulnerabilities even before a need for financial assistance arises. 
 
d) SGP review 
In 2014, a review of the ‘Six Pack’ and ‘Two Pack’ rules which was called for in 
the legislation, determined that the legislation had contributed to the progress of fiscal 
                                                          
34 CRAIG, Paul, “Economic Governance and the Euro Crisis: Constitutional Architecture and 
Constitutional Implications” (Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper) 2014 
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consolidation in the EU. The review highlighted some strengths as well as possible 
areas for improvement. 
This review introduced new features both to the Preventive and Corrective Arm 
of the SGP.  
On the Preventive Arm side it brought new enforcement specifications: A 
procedure for correcting significant deviation (0.5% in one year or cumulatively over 2 
years from the MTO or the adjustment path it). For euro area: financial sanctions in case 
of repeated non-compliance (interest-bearing deposit of 0.2% of GDP). 
On the Corrective Arm side it envisages for the euro area an early and gradual 
sanction system to be activated at each stage of the EDP procedure.35 
In 2015 The Commission issues guidance on how it will apply the SGP rules to 
strengthen the link between structural reforms, investment and fiscal responsibility in 
support of jobs and growth.36 
Under this guidance, among other guidelines, the Commission says it will take 
into account the existence of a dedicated structural reform plan, providing detailed and 
verifiable information, as well as credible timelines for adoption and delivery, when 
recommending a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit or the length of any 
extension to that deadline. The Commission will closely monitor the implementation of 
the reforms. In case of failure to implement, the Commission says it will take the 
necessary action. 
 There is, therefore, an underlying sense that the Commission wants to give a 
more flexible interpretation to the Preventive Arm of the SGP in order to accommodate 
structural reforms, investment and fiscal responsibility in support of jobs and growth. At 
the same time it reinforces its intention of enforcing this mechanism if states fail to 
comply as it says it will continue to assess effective action under the corrective arm of 
the Pact on the basis of a measurement of structural fiscal effort, excluding budgetary 
developments which are outside the control of governments. 
                                                          
35 Economic governance review Report on the application of Regulations (EU) n° 1173/2011, 1174/2011, 
1175/2011, 1176/2011, 1177/2011, 472/2013 and 473/2013 
36 Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament, The Council, The European 
Central Bank, The Economic And Social Committee, The Committee Of The Regions And The European 
Investment Bank from January 13th  2015. 




“The Launch of an Excessive Deficit Procedure” 
 
We have just gone through what was the evolution of the EMU, namely, the 
SGP and its features. We have learned how and why the system was put in place and 
how was it tested through time. We need now to analyse the result of all this changes 
and their current framework in order to access its enforceability. 
We have seen that the European Commission monitors economic developments 
in the EU’s Member States and in the global economy in detail. It monitors for potential 
problems, risks, unsustainable policies or declining competitiveness, through regular 
analysis, forecasts, assessments of national budgets and assessment of stability or 
convergence programmes. Then, to prevent economic problems from worsening and 
affecting other EU members, EU governments have agreed on a wide range of rules to 
ensure the quality and appropriateness of their economic policies. Finally, the EU’s 
system of economic rules is further strengthened by provisions to ensure that they are 
enforced and that governments take effective action to correct economic problems, the 
correction system, the Excessive Deficit Procedure or the Excessive Imbalance 
Procedure. We will now focus on the EDP. 
An EDP is launched by a Council decision based on a Commission proposal on 
the existence of an excessive deficit. The Commission proposal is based on a 
Commission report37 which considers the deficit and debt position of the Member State 
in question to see whether either or both of these positions merit the launch of an EDP. 
The breach in itself is just the first step; it triggers the writing of a report which 
considers in detail a series of factors and concludes whether the breach of the criteria 
merits the launch of an EDP against the Member State in question. 
The identification of the breach can be based on either outturns, plans or forecast 
data. The launch of an EDP on the basis of forecast data can be based on either the 
Member State's plans – as outlined in their Stability or Convergence Programmes or in 
other announcements made by the government – or on the Commission's forecasts. 
                                                          
37 Article 126, paragraph 3 of the TFEU. 
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It is then established the non-compliance with the deficit criterion if the Member 
State is non-compliant with the deficit requirement, i.e. if its general government deficit 
is greater than 3% of GDP. This Report will conclude whether the Member State in 
question should have an EDP opened. The Treaty, and by extension the SGP, provides 
two exception clauses with regard to the opening of an excessive deficit procedure on 
the basis of the deficit criterion. Member States are deemed to have complied with their 
deficit commitment if at least one of the two following conditions is met: the deficit has 
declined substantially and continuously and has reached a level close to 3% of GDP; the 
excess is only exceptional and temporary, and the deficit value is still close to 3% of 
GDP.38 
A deficit above 3% of GDP is considered exceptional when it results (i) either 
from an unusual event outside of the Member State's control and with a major impact on 
its public finances, or (ii) from a severe economic downturn. A severe economic 
downturn is defined as a negative real growth of GDP or as an accumulated loss of 
output during a protracted period of very low real growth of GDP relative to its 
potential. The excess over 3% is considered temporary if the Commission forecasts 
indicate that the deficit will fall below 3% following the end of the unusual event or the 
severe economic downturn.39 
The Report is submitted to the Economic and Financial Committee which has 2 
weeks following its adoption by the Commission to formulate an opinion under Article 
126 paragraph 4. 
The report presents an overall assessment of the deficit situation. Article 126 
paragraph 3 specifies:  
"The report of the Commission shall also take into account whether the 
government deficit exceeds government investment expenditure and take into account 
all other relevant factors, including the medium-term economic and budgetary position 
of the Member State.". 
                                                          
38 European commission, “Vade mecum on the Stability and Growth Pact”, Occasional Papers 151, May, 
2013. 
39 Idem. 
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Regulation 1467/97 gives further details on the relevant factors to be taken into 
account, presenting a list that falls under three headings: developments in the medium-
term economic position, developments in the medium-term budgetary positions and 
developments in the medium-term government debt position. However, the regulation 
states that this list is not exhaustive and also the following: 
"The Commission shall give due and express consideration to any other factors 
which, in the opinion of the Member State concerned, are relevant in order to 
comprehensively assess compliance with deficit and debt criteria and which the 
Member State has put forward to the Council and the Commission. In that context, 
particular consideration shall be given to financial contributions to fostering 
international solidarity and achieving the policy goals of the Union, the debt incurred 
in the form of bilateral and multilateral support between Member States in the context 
of safeguarding financial stability, and the debt related to financial stabilisation 
operations during major financial disturbances". 
Once consideration has been taken of the wider economic context and all 
relevant factors, the Article 126 report concludes whether the data should lead to the 
Member State being placed in EDP. Either way, the report is forwarded to the 
Economic and Financial Committee of the Council which has 2 weeks to formulate an 
opinion. 
In addition, where the conclusion of the report is that the Member State should 
be placed in EDP, the Commission addresses an opinion to that effect to the Member 
State concerned and inform the Council accordingly. It also prepares a recommendation 
for a Council decision on the existence of an excessive deficit under Article 126, 
paragraph 6, and a recommendation for a Council recommendation under Article 126, 









“Council’s Country Specific Recommendations under EDP” 
 
Article 126, paragraph 7, tells us how those recommendations must be put 
forward. The Commission recommendation for a Council recommendation under 
Article 126 paragraph 7 to correct the excessive deficit contains an analysis of the 
situation, a timeframe and annual targets for the nominal and structural deficit linked by 
an underlying macroeconomic scenario. 
The aim of the Article 126 paragraph 7 Recommendation is to present a credible 
path for the timely correction of the excessive deficit. According to Article 3, paragraph 
4, of the Regulation 1467/97: “The Council recommendation shall also establish a 
deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit, which shall be completed in the year 
following its identification unless there are special circumstances. In its 
recommendation, the Council shall request that the Member State achieve annual 
budgetary targets which, on the basis of the forecast underpinning the recommendation, 
are consistent with a minimum annual improvement of at least 0.5 % of GDP as a 
benchmark, in its cyclically adjusted balance net of one-off and temporary measures, in 
order to ensure the correction of the excessive deficit within the deadline set in the 
recommendation.” 
Article 2(6) of Regulation 1467/97 specifies that: "If the Council, acting under 
Article 126(6) TFEU, decides that an excessive deficit exists in a Member State, the 
Council and the Commission shall, in the subsequent procedural steps of that Article of 
the TFEU, take into account the relevant factors referred to in paragraph 3 of this 
Article, as they affect the situation of the Member State concerned, including as 
specified in Article 3(5) and Article 5(2) of this Regulation, in particular in establishing 
a deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit and eventually extending that 
deadline.". 
Three quantitative budgetary objectives are required to be set in EDP 
recommendations: (i) A deadline for the correction of the excessive deficit; (ii) A path 
towards the correction of the excessive deficit with intermediary annual targets for the 
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general government balance; (iii) Annual fiscal effort of at least 0.5% of GDP, defined 
in structural terms, consistent with the nominal path towards the correction of the 
excessive deficit. 
Under Article 126 paragraph 7 recommendations also establish a maximum 
deadline of six months for effective action to be taken in order to correct the excessive 
deficit in a timely manner, unless the seriousness of the situation justifies a deadline for 
effective action of three months. Alongside the deadline for action, the recommendation 
also specifies the deadline by which the Member State should submit a report on the 
action taken on which the Commission will base its assessment of effective action. 
Following the expiry of the date for taking effective action and based on the 
Member State's report, the Commission examines it to see whether the Member State 
has complied with the Article 126 paragraph 7 recommendations. This is done by 
assessing whether the Member State is forecast to meet all the nominal targets, 
according to the Commission forecasts. If some of the years covered by the EDP are not 
within the time horizon of the Commission forecasts, the assessment of compliance is 
preliminary and focuses on the credibility of the Member States' plans. According to the 
Code of Conduct, this preliminary assessment should consider whether the Member 
State concerned has publicly announced or taken measures that seem sufficient to 
ensure adequate progress towards the correction of the excessive deficit within the time 
limits set by the Council.40 
If the Commission considers that the Member State has acted in compliance with 
the recommendation (or notice) and that the EDP fiscal requirements are likely to be 
fulfilled, it informs the Council of its assessment and the procedure is held in abeyance. 
Otherwise, the procedure is either stepped-up (if no effective action has been taken – 
see below) or a revised EDP recommendation is issued (if the assessment of effective 
action is positive but “unexpected adverse economic events with major unfavourable 
consequences for government finances occurred”.41 
                                                          
40Economic and Financial Committee  “Specifications on the implementation of the Stability and Growth 
Pact and Guidelines on the format and content of Stability and Convergence Programmes” July, 2016, 
available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/sgp/pdf/coc/code_of_conduct_en.pdf  
41 Art. 3(5) of Council Regulation (EC) 1467/97. 
  ‘Til Debt Do Us Part 
26 
 
If the Member State is not compliant with the nominal targets, an assessment of 
effective action will be undertaken. The focus of this will be the structural adjustment, 
with the aim of determining whether the Member State has actually taken effective 
action of the magnitude required in its Article 126 paragraph 7 recommendations, i.e. 
Member States that have improved their structural balance in line with the 
recommendations will be assessed as having taken effective action.42 
Where the Commission concludes that effective action has not been taken, it 
issues a recommendation for a Council decision establishing ineffective action under 
Article 126 paragraph 8. The Commission then issues a recommendation for a decision 
to give notice under Article 126 paragraph 9 for euro area Member States, or for new 
recommendations under Article 126 paragraph 7 for non-euro area Member States. 
Following the Council's adoption of a decision under Article 126 paragraph 8 
establishing non-effective action to the Article 126 paragraph 7 recommendations, the 
Commission shall issue a recommendation for a Council decision requiring the euro 
area Member State to pay a fine equal to 0.2% of their previous year's GDP, as a rule. 
The Commission shall issue its recommendation within 20 days of the Council's 
adoption of the decision. The fine will be payable to the Commission and will be 
assigned to the European Stability Mechanism. If the country had already lodged a non-
interest bearing deposit under the preventive arm, it will converted into a fine and any 
difference in the applicable amount will be returned to the Member State or made up by 
it. 
The Council’s decision on the imposition of a fine shall be considered adopted, 
unless the Council decides to reject the Commission's recommendation within 10 days, 
using qualified majority voting. While the default position is for the Commission to ask 
                                                          
42 The Code of Conduct specifies that: "A Member State should be considered to have taken ‘effective 
action’ if it has acted in compliance with the recommendation or notice, regarding both the 
implementation of the measures required therein and budgetary execution. The assessment should in 
particular take into account whether the Member State concerned has achieved the annual budgetary 
targets initially recommended by the Council and the underlying improvement in the cyclically adjusted 
balance net of one off and other temporary measures. In case the observed budget balance proves to be 
lower than recommended or if the improvement of the cyclically-adjusted balance net of one-off and other 
temporary measures falls significantly short of the adjustment underlying the target, a careful analysis of 
the reasons for the shortfall would be made. In particular, the analysis should take into account whether 
expenditure targets have been met and the planned discretionary measures on the revenue side have been 
implemented.". 
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for a fine equal to 0.2% of the previous year's GDP, the Commission may recommend 
that the Council reduce the amount or cancel the fine altogether. This can happen on the 
grounds of exceptional economic circumstances or following the reasoned request by 
the Member State concerned, addressed to the Commission within 10 days of the 
Council's adoption of the Article 126 paragraph 8 decision. The Council may also 
amend the Commission’s recommendation for a fine using qualified majority voting and 
adopt the amended text as a Council decision.  
In addition, as Article 4 paragraph 1 a) of Council Regulation (EC) No 
1084/2006 of 11 July 2006 establishing a Cohesion Fund and repealing Regulation (EC) 
No 1164/94 asserts the conditionality of Cohesion Fund assistance on an absence of an 
excessive deficit, any EU Member State that is a recipient of the Cohesion fund, could 
have its commitments under the Fund suspended following an Article 126 paragraph 8 
decision. 
Following the adoption of an Article 126 paragraph 8 decision establishing non-
effective action to Article 126 paragraph 7 recommendations, regulation 1467/97 
requires that a Council decision to give notice to euro area Member States to take 
measures for deficit reduction according to Article 126 paragraph 9 be taken within 2 
months. The Commission therefore prepares a Commission recommendation for this 
notice within that timescale Notice under Article 126 paragraph 9 differs from the 
Article 126 paragraph 7 recommendations in that there is an explicit requirement in 
Regulation 1467/97 for the notice to indicate measures conducive to the achievement of 
the budgetary targets. 
Member States submit reports to the Council and the Commission which set out 
measures taken, in line with the notice under 126 paragraph 9. The reports, which are 
made public by the Member State, include the targets for government expenditure and 
revenue and for the discretionary measures on both the expenditure and the revenue side 
and information on the measures taken in response to the particular Council notice. 
Where the Commission concludes, following the assessment of the report that 
effective action has not been taken, it issues a recommendation for a Council decision 
establishing ineffective action under Article 126 paragraph 11, which should 
impose/intensify sanctions. Following an Article 126 paragraph 11 recommendation the 
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Commission will then issue a new recommendation for a decision giving notice under 
Article 126 paragraph 9. 
Each year after the imposition of such a fine, the Commission will assess 
whether the Member State has taken effective action in relation to its Article 126 
paragraph 9 notice and issue a recommendation to the Council to take a decision about 
effective or non-effective action. Where the recommendation is for a non-effective 
action decision, the Commission will recommend a new decision under Article 126 
paragraph 11 and hence the imposition of another fine. Fines should therefore be paid 
every year until the EDP is placed in abeyance or abrogated. The fines will be assigned 














                                                          
43 European commission, “Vade mecum on the Stability and Growth Pact”, Occasional Papers 151, May, 
2013. 




“EDP Recommendations under EU Law” 
 
As we have just seen there is a clear and automatic sanctioning system put in 
place following Council’s country specific recommendations under an EDP under 
Article 126 paragraph 11 when non-effective action is established under Article 126 
paragraph 7 and paragraph 9 that implies enforceability of such Recommendations. We 
must now look more closely to Recommendation’s framework under EU law in order to 
understand its legal grounds and accesses the level of enforceability that the 
Recommendations in question imply.44 
Article 288 TFEU lists Recommendations as a legal act of the Union by stating 
that to exercise the Union's competences, the institutions shall adopt regulations, 
directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions. Regarding Recommendations 
specifically the treaty expressly says that “Recommendations and opinions shall have no 
binding force”. However the expression “binding force” has to be cautiously analysed 
when faced with specific Recommendations such as those put forward under an EDP 
and the European Semester. 
In this respect it should be noted that there are opinions from EU institutions 
which may be binding. For instance, opinions of the Court have a legally binding force, 
resulting from the fact that EU law preconizes the need, in some cases, for such 
opinions to be respected. Also, a preliminary reference to the Court under Article 267 
TFEU, may relate to the validity and interpretation of acts adopted by the institutions, 
bodies or agencies. This formulation, referring widely to “acts”, includes the whole set 
of "legal acts”, secondary legislation of the Union listed in Article 288 TFEU, among 
which are, of course, Recommendations of the EU institutions. So, the formulation of 
Article 288 precludes Recommendations from having direct effect, but it does not 
immunized them from the judicial processes. It its open to a national court to make a 
                                                          
44   MADURO,  Miguel Poiares; FRADA, António; PIERDOMINICI, Leonardo, “A Crisis Between 
Crisis; Placing the Portuguese Constitutional Jurisprudence of Crisis in Context” (E-Pública Revista 
Eletrónica de Direito Público, Vol. 4, nº 1, May, 2017) pp. 19 
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reference to the ECJ concerning the interpretation or validity of such measure, as it 
happened in the Grilmadi case.45 
The Court, when confronted directly, in the Grimaldi judgment, with the 
problem of the effects of a Commission Recommendation, although expressing that 
Recommendations are acts that are not intended to produce binding effects, even in 
relation to the recipients and, in particular, that cannot create rights for individuals 
before a national court, did not fail to state clearly that Recommendations are legal acts 
of the Union, that cannot be considered as having no legal effect. In the view of the 
Court, “national courts are bound to take those recommendations into consideration in 
order to decide disputes submitted to them, in particular where they are capable of 
casting light on the interpretation of other provisions of national or Community law.” 
Therefore, Member States’ courts should consider in the context of the principle 
of interpretation national law in accordance with European Union Law.46 It might have 
been thought, in the wake of Von Colson,47 that national courts would only be required 
to consider the instruments that can be directly applicable in national courts (i.e. the 
provisions of the Treaty, regulations, decisions and directives) . In 1989, however, the 
Court established that the rule of consistent interpretation was a separate principle in its 
own right. It may have been developed in the context in which it sought to find ways to 
ensure the effectiveness of directives before national courts but as early as 1989, this is 
no longer the only goal. In Grimaldi, the Court held that national courts should take into 
account not only “hard law”, but also recommendations.48  
Incidentally, in the judgment Altair Chimica49, 2003, the Court goes even 
further, to rule on the interpretation of Recommendation 81/924 / EEC of 27 October 
1981 concerning the tariff structures for electricity in the Union. The Court held that 
this Recommendation gave indications as to the different costs that the prices must 
cover but did not, however have any evidence to show that it can be interpreted as 
                                                          
45 Case C-322/88 Grimaldi v Fonds des Maladies Professionelles [1989] ECR 4407. 
46 MADURO,  Miguel Poiares; FRADA, António; PIERDOMINICI, Leonardo, “A Crisis Between Crisis; 
Placing the Portuguese Constitutional Jurisprudence of Crisis in Context” (E-Pública Revista Eletrónica 
de Direito Público, Vol. 4, nº 1, May, 2017) pp. 13 
47 Case 14/83 Von Colson v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, [1984] ECR 1891 
48 CHALMERS, Damian, DAVIES, Gareth, MONTI, Georgio, “European Union Law”, 2nd edition, 
2010, Cambrigde University Press, p. 300.  
49 Case C-207/01 Altair Chimica SpA v ENEL Distribuzione SpA [2003] ECR I-8875 
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applying to the adoption of a tax electric power consumption. Then concluded that in 
those circumstances, it must be said that Recommendation 81/924 was not capable of 
preventing a Member State from levying surcharges such as those at issue in the main 
proceedings. The ECJ reveals in this judgment that the Council Recommendation in 
question could, in general thesis, if it could be construed to apply to the adoption of 
taxes on electricity and yet be a Recommendation, have the effect of preventing a 
Member State to charge certain supplements like those which were involved in the 
proceedings. In this sense, the recommendation would have legal effects, if they were 
not considered legally binding for the Member State, they would be very close, to it, as 
the reasoning of the Court clearly opens the door to an a contrario interpretation, 
according to which, if the Recommendation could be interpreted in the sense that it 
applied also to situations involving the introduction of taxes on electricity consumption, 
then, notwithstanding being a recommendation, it would prevent a Member State from 
charging supplements like those involved in the proceedings at hand. 
In practice, the result was that the Member State would be prevented, according 
to EU Law, to act in violation of the recommendation. In essence, the Court’s reasoning 
relies much more on the interpretation of the content of the Recommendation in order to 
realize its substantive scope of application, than on the rather formal element that what 
it had at hand to interpret was a recommendation, non-binding according to the black-
letter of article 288 TFEU.50 
It results from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice that 
recommendations, even if they are not considered legally they may produce legal 
effects, and, notably, an obligation to interpret national law in light of such 
recommendations.51 
Therefore, if to enforce means to compel observance of or obedience to, 
enforceable means capable of being enforced. A right or obligation is enforceable if a 
party obligated to an act can be forced or ordered to comply with the legal process. 
                                                          
50 MADURO,  Miguel Poiares; FRADA, António; PIERDOMINICI, Leonardo, “A Crisis Between Crisis; 
Placing the Portuguese Constitutional Jurisprudence of Crisis in Context” (E-Pública Revista Eletrónica 
de Direito Público, Vol. 4, nº 1, May, 2017) pp. 22 
51 Idem. pp. 23 
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In the case of the EDP, by setting that when Member States draft budgetary 
plans they should be consistent with and have to take into account the 
Recommendations issued under the EDP context, and that these legal acts of the 
Council have to be met, otherwise sanctions will be brought against the Member State, 
it is legitimate to consider that Recommendations have legal enforceability for Member 
States to whom they are addressed, therefore recommendations will not have a legal 
binding force by itself, but that such legal binding force results from the content of a 
rule mandating compliance with such recommendations52 
When EMU Treaty Provisions and SGP Regulations provide that national 
budgets have to be coherent with the Recommendations adopted in the context of the 
SGP and that Member States must put in practice and comply with such 
recommendations, it is appropriate to consider that we are in the face of 
Recommendations that, by virtue of those other rules, legally bind member States to 
whom they are addressed as it triggers the operation of the sanction mechanisms alluded 
in article 126(11) TFEU and the proceedings to be followed for the adoption of those 
sanctions detailed in articles 5, 6 and 7 of Regulation 1467/97 as well as, additionally, 
in articles 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Regulation 1173/2011. 
In other words, Council Recommendations adopted in the context of a EDP, are 
EU legal acts that, not only produce legal effects for the Member States to whom they 
are addressed, but also might be rightly regarded as effectively or ‘de facto’ binding 
those Member States, since non-compliance with those recommendations involves an 
actual and concrete risk for such Member States of becoming subject to significant 
sanctions.  
Of course, the specific normative force of some recommendations may still raise 
some doubts and difficulties as there might be recommendations that have a more 
general character, setting forth deficit targets and objectives but no specific measures to 
achieve them. The legal binding character of such recommendations cannot, in any case, 
be excluded. Much to the contrary, the question must be referred to the ECJ. 53 
                                                          
52 Idem. 
53 Idem. pp. 24 






There is therefore a double enforceability regarding Council’s country-specific 
Recommendations under an Excessive Deficit Procedure. 
On one side, the failure to comply with Council’s Recommendations by the 
Member State to whom they are addressed within a EDP results in the implementation 
of sanction mechanisms provided for in Article 126, paragraph 11 of the TFEU, with the 
following procedures in the adoption of these detailed sanctions in articles 5, 6 and 7 of 
Regulation No 1467/97, as well as additionally in Regulation No 1173/2011. Given this 
procedural control framework, quasi-automatic, in particular by the Commission (and 
Council), the fulfilment of the established deficit targets and the adoption of the 
recommended measures for this purpose, these recommendations, particularly in the 
context of a EDP, may also not be regarded as devoid of effects on the Member States 
to whom they are addressed. This entails a quasi-automatic mechanism of monitoring 
compliance with the Recommendations of the Commission, in particular, because of the 
inverse vote mechanism on Article 5, paragraph 2 of Regulation 1173/2011. This 
provides that a decision recommended by the Commission to impose the constitution of 
unpaid deposit to the defaulting member State to obligations under the SGP is 
considered "as adopted by the Council", "unless it [Council] decides by qualified 
majority to reject the Commission's Recommendation within 10 days of its adoption by 
the Commission.  
Also, Council’s country-specific Recommendations under an Excessive Deficit 
Procedure should even be considered endowed with a binding character from,as 
Recommendations can be considered legal acts of the Union with a special or enhanced 
legal significance, different from the majority of the Recommendations from other EU 
institutions or bodies due to the ECJ stand on Recommendations as seen above. Also the 
outset that reference is made in Regulation No 1467/97 (in its current version) and by 
Regulation No 473/2013, Regulations as legislative legal acts of the Union have clear 
legal force and binding on the Member States, as is clear from Article 288 TFEU which 
  ‘Til Debt Do Us Part 
34 
 
establishes that "A regulation shall have general application. It shall be binding in its 
entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.". Therefore Recommendations act 
as to complete in substance EU Regulations that are uniquely endowed with binding 
character. 
In light of what was said it clearly results from the legal framework of the EMU 
that Recommendations under the EDP impose duties to act and also provide for 
penalties in case of non-compliance, providing for a clear understanding that these 
Recommendations have binding force, making them undoubtedly enforceable by 
national courts under the principle of interpretation national law in accordance with 
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